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Abstract
The paper develops a two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model of growth without scale effects to
explore the effects of globalization on long-run growth and wages. Higher quality products are endogenously
discovered through stochastic and sequential global innovation contests in which challengers devote
resources to R&D and technology leaders undertake rent-protection activities (RPAs) to prolong the expected
duration of temporary monopoly power by frustrating the R&D effort of challengers.  Globalization (i.e., a
move from autarky to an integrated trading equilibrium) for two countries with identical relative factor
abundance and possible differences in size does not affect the long-run growth rate of either country.
However, the country that is abundant in the factor used intensively in the production of R&D services grows
faster in autarky.  Moreover, factor prices (adjusted for quality) and national long-run growth rates converge
and are eventually equalized.  Depending on international per-capita differences in factor abundance, the
model also generates intra-sectoral trade, vertical and horizontal multinationals, and international outsourcing
of services (R&D investment or RPAs).  The growth effects of globalization between countries with different
relative factor endowments are larger for smaller countries.
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1. Introduction
Endogenous growth theory is now more than ten years old.  Nonetheless, our understanding of the
relationship between globalization, economic growth and income distribution remains incomplete. 
Empirical studies on the determinants of economic growth that rely on cross-country growth regressions
either treat each country as a closed economy or introduce ad hoc variables correlated with economic
openness.  These studies have found that globalization has a small and rather insignificant effect on long-
run growth.   In contrast, earlier research on endogenous growth analyzed the effects of globalization on
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long-run growth in various contexts.  Perhaps the most dominant channel through which the introduction
of trade affects (positively) the level of long-run growth [e.g., Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991a)] has been
the size of markets.  By expanding the size of each country’s market, international trade raises the
profitability of R&D in all trading partners, thus accelerating the introduction of new products and
resulting in faster global long-run growth.  This seemingly obvious insight has given researchers the
impetus to explore how market size affects long-run growth [e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapter
5)] and to explore the effects of globalization for countries with identical factor endowments, [e.g.,
Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991a,b)].
The dependence of long-run growth on market size in earlier endogenous growth models can be
traced to the property of scale effects which is a consequence of the assumption that the growth rate of
knowledge (i.e., technological progress) is directly proportional to the level of resources devoted to
R&D.   Jones (1995a) has argued that the scale effects property of earlier endogenous growth models is
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inconsistent with post-war time-series evidence which shows an exponential increase in R&D resources
and a more-or-less constant rate of per-capita GDP growth in all major advanced countries.  In addition,
the introduction of population growth in earlier endogenous growth models generates unbounded
(infinite) per-capita long-run growth.  Jones’ criticism and the desire to explicitly incorporate the rate of
population growth in R&D-based growth models have stimulated the development of a new class of
models that generate growth without scale effects.   However, the theoretical literature on growth without
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scale effects has focused either on the effects of trade liberalization in the case of  structurally identical
economies, or more recently on the effects of globalization on growth and poverty in the context of
North-South models of trade and technology transfer.   Importantly, this small but expanding literature
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has not addressed the question of how globalization affects economic growth, especially when countries
differ in relative factor endowments.  This paper complements the aforementioned literature by placing at
center stage the role of factor endowments and skill intensities in the determination of the dynamic
effects of globalization. 
The rise of the anti-globalization movement has renewed the policy and academic debate on the
pros and cons of globalization. The role of trade liberalization, short term capital flows, multinational
corporations, global institutions, and the outsourcing of services and jobs to China and India, on poverty
and income distribution within and across countries are central elements of this debate.  Bhagwati,
(2004) and Stiglitz (2003) respectively provide influential overviews and analysis of globalization. 
Given the policy importance of these issues and the inherent problems with the quality of international
data, there is a need to formally and systematically analyze the economic forces that govern the complex
effects of globalization.  This paper constructs a two-country dynamic-general equilibrium model of
scale-invariant growth to investigate the dynamic effects of globalization.
In the model, the scale-effects property is removed by the introduction of rent-protecting activities
(RPAs), as in the closed-economy model developed by Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (1991).   These are
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activities undertaken by firms that produce state-of-the art quality products and aim to prolong their
temporary monopoly power by increasing the difficulty of R&D among challengers who try to discover
higher quality products.  Examples of these activities include investment in trade secrecy, camouflage of
innovations through technological complexity, employment of legal teams to litigate potential patent
infringements, and patent-blocking (i.e., building a patent fence around a major invention by patenting
several related secondary inventions without necessarily introducing the latter into the market).
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In the model, there are two countries, Home and Foreign, that may differ in size and or in (relative)3
factor abundance.  In each country, there is a continuum of structurally identical industries producing
final consumption goods, and two factors of production, high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor, with
each factor being equal to a fixed fraction of each economy’s population.  The population in each country
grows at a common and exogenously given rate, equal to the growth rate of each factor of production. 
There are three activities in each industry: manufacturing of final goods, rent-protecting activities
(RPAs), and R&D services.  Production in each of these activities requires the employment of both
factors (though in different proportions when evaluated at the same factor prices) and exhibits constant
returns to scale.   This framework allows us to use insights from the traditional Hechscher-Ohlin trade
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model in our study of the dynamic effects of globalization.  As in the Grossman and Helpman (1991,
Chapter 4) version of the quality-ladders growth model, the quality of each final good can be improved
through endogenous innovation.  The arrival of innovations in each industry is governed by a memoryless
Poisson process whose intensity depends on the ratio of R&D to RPAs.  Thus, the present model views
innovation as the outcome of sequential and stochastic R&D contests (as opposed to R&D races among
challengers). 
The analysis generates several novel insights.  The market-equilibrium growth rate equals the ratio
of the unit-cost function of RPAs over the unit-cost function of R&D services.  Since this ratio plays a
role very similar to one played by the terms of trade (relative price of exports in terms of imports) in
traditional trade theory, we christen this ratio an economy’s “terms-of-growth” (TOG).  In the long run,
the TOG remain constant over time and, owing to constant returns to scale, depends only on factor prices
and a parameter related to the effectiveness of RPAs.  In other words, long-run growth turns out to be
proportional to the “opportunity cost” of RPAs measured in units of R&D services (i.e., the “relative
price” of RPAs).  A permanent increase in the relative wage of high-skilled labor raises the opportunity
cost of RPAs (and thus and the growth rate) if and only if high-skilled labor is used more intensively in
RPAs than in R&D (Lemma 1).  As a consequence, any policy that causes relative wages to change
affects long-run growth through the familiar Stolper and Samuelson (1941) channel that links relative4
price changes to changes in factor rewards.  In short, Lemma 1 provides a formal link between changes in
income distribution and long-run Schumpeterian growth through the intensity ranking of two conflicting
forces that determine the expected frequency of innovations: rent-protecting activities and R&D
investment. 
Lemma 1 provides a novel insight on the long-run effects of one dimension of stronger intellectual
property protection.  In the model, this effect can be captured by exogenously changing a parameter that
captures the effectiveness of RPAs.  In a global regime with stronger intellectual property protection,
incumbent firms are able to slow down the rate of creative destruction by being more effective in limiting
the knowledge spillovers to challengers for any given relative wage level.  The model implies that higher
protection of intellectual property shifts resources from investment related activities 6 such as R&D and
RPAs 6 to manufacturing of final consumption goods and therefore benefits the factor of production used
intensively in manufacturing (say, less-skilled labor).  In addition, under reasonable restrictions on 
intensities and abundance, Proposition 2 establishes that stronger intellectual right protection reduces
long-run growth and innovation.  This result complements similar findings in Sener (2003) and
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2004) which have analyzed the implications of stronger intellectual property
protection in the context of North-South models of scale-invariant growth with endogenous imitation.  In
these models, increasing the difficulty of copying Northern products by Southern firms results in slower
growth.  Consequently, contrary to the popular notion, dynamic trade theory suggests that agreements
like TRIPs (Trade-Related-Intellectual-Property Rights) might have an adverse effect on dynamic R&D
competition, innovation and growth.
Armed with Lemma 1, we then put the model to work to analyze the growth effects of introducing
trade between two countries that initially differ only in size captured by their level of population.  A
move from autarky to free trade generates inter-sectoral trade as each country contains a fraction of
quality leaders producing the state-of-the-art quality product and enjoying global (temporary) monopoly
power at each instant in time.  Each country’s share of global monopolists is proportional to its size. 5
However, in the absence of scale effects, a move from autarky to free trade does not affect the relative
wage of high-skilled labor and on long-run growth (Proposition 3).  In this case, globalization simply
redistributes per-capita resources within manufacturing of final consumption goods in each country, but
does not affect per-capita resources devoted to R&D and RPAs.  In other words, in the model of growth
without scale effects considered here, a move from autarky to free trade among similar countries does not
affect long-run economic growth.  We think that this result remains valid in other models of scale-
invariant growth and clarifies the main insight obtained by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999b) where
reciprocal tariff reductions affect the level of  scale-invariant growth and the relative wage by changing
the relative price of innovation (i.e., the TOG).
We also analyze the move from autarky to the integrated world equilibrium (i.e., the equilibrium
that would emerge if, in addition to free trade in goods, all factors of production were also internationally
mobile).  Since the three activities (RPAs, R&D and manufacturing) correspond to different vertical
stages of production and there is no outside-good sector, trade in goods is not sufficient to replicate the
integrated world equilibrium.  In the presence of differences in skill abundance across the two countries,
the integrated world equilibrium generates a rich and realistic pattern of global production.  Suppose the
production of RPAs is more high-skilled labor intensive than the production of R&D services, with
manufacturing being the least skilled labor intensive activity.  In this case, as the skill abundance of say
Home increases relative to the skill abundance of Foreign, the integrated world equilibrium can be
maintained, first, through the formation of Home multinationals that establish manufacturing facilities in
Foreign to serve each domestic market (horizontal DFI) or to serve the world market (vertical DFI).  The
same equilibrium is consistent with outsourcing of manufacturing production and jobs from Home to
Foreign.  However, as the skill abundance differential between Home and Foreign increases, in addition
to multinationals and/or manufacturing outsourcing, Home engages in outsourcing R&D services (i.e.,
exporting high-tech jobs) to Foreign. 
We then examine the effects of globalization which we identify with a move from autarky to the6
integrated-world equilibrium under the assumptions that the distribution of national factor endowments
lies within the factor price equalization set and Home is skill abundant.  Under the assumption on the
ranking of skill intensities across activities mentioned earlier, Home has a lower relative wage than
Foreign under autarky due to its skill abundance and experiences a lower long-run growth rate than
Foreign (Proposition 3).  In this case, globalization causes the relative wage of skilled labor to be
equalized across the two countries and  long-run growth rates to converge to a common level.  As a
result, the high-skilled abundant country’s growth rate rises while the low-skilled abundant country’s
growth rate falls.  Exactly the opposite is true if the production of R&D is more high-skilled labor
intensive than the production of RPAs (Proposition 5). 
Section 2 of the paper develops the two-country model.  Section 3 analyzes the properties of the
steady-state integrated-world equilibrium.  Section 4 examines the effects of globalization on long-run
growth.  Finally, Section 5 summarizes our findings and identifies several avenues for future research.
2. The Model
We build a two-country dynamic general-equilibrium model of scale-invariant growth that focuses on the
effects of globalization on long-run growth and wages.  We model the innovation process as a contest
between each incumbent global quality leader and challengers.  This stands in contrast to traditional
quality-ladders growth models which view the discovery of new products as an R&D race among
challengers.  In the present model, each incumbent quality leader can prolong the expected duration of its
global monopoly by engaging in rent-protection activities that reduce the instantaneous probability of
further innovation.  At the same time, however, challengers in both countries engage in R&D to discover
the next higher-quality product that would replace the global quality leader.
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that all firms in the global economy know how to
produce all products that are at least one step below the state-of-the-art quality product in each industry. 



















inertia-incumbency hypothesis [see Arrow (1962)] which is a standard assumption in most quality-
ladders growth models.  In other words, incumbent monopolists engage only in RPAs and challengers
perform only R&D.   It should be noted that the model abstracts from issues of international technology
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transfer and international knowledge spillovers.
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For clarity of exposition, we adopt the following notational conventions.  Superscripts identify
countries; in particular, superscripts “h” and “f” identify functions and variables of the “Home” and
“Foreign” countries, respectively.  Functions and variables without superscripts are associated with the
global economy.  Subscripts identify activities and firms within an industry.  The time argument indicates
that a variable is growing in the steady-state equilibrium; its absence means that the particular variable
remains constant over time.
2.1 The Knowledge-Creation Process
Each of the two economies is populated by a continuum of structurally identical industries indexed by
.  In each industry   there are global, sequential and stochastic R&D contests that result in the
discovery of higher-quality final products.  At time t, each challenger k that is located in country   
targeting a quality leader in country   engages in R&D in industry   that leads to the discovery
of the next higher-quality product with instantaneous probability  , where
(1)
with   denoting the level of R&D services, and   being a function that captures the
difficulty of conducting R&D in industry   at time t.  As will be explained shortly, this function captures
the level of rent protection activities (RPAs) 
Under the standard assumption (routinely adopted in quality-ladders growth models), that the
returns to R&D investment are independently distributed across challengers, countries, industries andI j(￿,t) ￿ Y j(￿,t)
D m(￿,t)
,













over time, the industry-wide probability of innovation in each country j is obtained from (1) by summing
the levels of R&D services across all challengers in that country
(2)
where  .  The arrival of innovations in each industry follows a memoryless Poisson
process with intensity   which equals the global rate of innovation in a typical
industry.  An increase in the rate of innovation results in faster long-run economic growth.
We assume that the difficulty of conducting R&D in (1) and (2) [i.e.,  ] is proportional to
the level of RPAs undertaken by a typical quality leader located in country  ; that is,
(3)
where   is the level of RPAs  produced by an incumbent global quality leader located in country
m.  Parameter   captures the effectiveness (or productivity) of RPAs in increasing the difficulty of
conducting R&D.  We can think of   as a parameter capturing the efficiency of institutions that
safeguard intellectual property.
Equations (2) and (3) reveal that the instantaneous probability of discovering the next higher-
quality good is homogeneous of degree zero in R&D and RPAs.  Moreover, if an incumbent monopolist
does not engage in RPAs, the discovery of the next higher-quality product occurs instantaneously since
 in this case.  In addition, for any finite level of R&D services, the innovation process stops if
.
2.2 Production Technology 
There are three distinct activities in each industry: manufacturing of final products, rent-protecting
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factors of production, high-skilled and low-skilled labor.  Let   and   respectively denote the wages
of high-skilled and low-skilled labor in country j.  Moreover, denote with  ,  , and 
the output of manufactures, RPAs and R&D services produced in country j, respectively.  The technology




where   is the unit-cost function associated with activity i=Z,X,Y.  This function is increasing,
concave, homogeneous of degree one in its arguments, and has positive cross-partial derivatives.  Note
that the absence of a superscript in the unit cost functions implies that they are the same across countries,
industries and goods of different quality levels.
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2.3 Population and Households
Let   be country j’s population at time t.  We assume that each country’s population is growing at a
common, constant, exogenously given rate  , and that it is partitioned into high and
low-skilled workers.  In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that each worker
supplies one unit of labor and that a (fixed) fraction   of country j’s population consists of high-
skilled workers with the remaining population fraction consisting of low-skilled workers.  Consequently,
country j’s endowment of high-skilled labor is  , whereas its endowment of low-skilled
labor is  .  Over time, both endowments grow exponentially at the rate  ; that is,
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,
c j(t) p j(t)
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where   is the world population at time t.
11
In each country j there is a continuum of identical households of measure   .  Each household
consists of infinitely-lived members and is modeled as a dynastic family whose size grows over time at
an exogenous rate  .  Country j’s population, as well as the number of each household’s members, at
time t is   where   is the initial population.  All households within a country are
identical but countries may differ in the fraction of high-skilled workers.  Each household in country j
maximizes the discounted utility
(8)
where   is the subjective discount rate,   is the effective discount rate, and   is the
per-capita utility at time t, defined as
(9)
 is the quantity consumed of a good of quality i (i.e., a product that has experienced i quality
improvements) and produced in industry   at time t.  Parameter   measures the size of quality
improvements (i.e., the magnitude of innovations).
At each instant in time each household allocates income to maximize (9) taking product prices as
given.  The solution to this maximization problem yields a Cobb-Douglas demand function
(10)
where   is country j’s per-capita consumption expenditure and   is the relevant market price for
each good.  Because within each industry goods adjusted for quality are by assumption identical [see
(9)], only the good with the lowest quality-adjusted price is consumed, since there is no demand for anyZ(i,￿,t) ￿ Z h(i,￿,t)￿ Z f(i,￿,t).
￿ c j(t)
c j(t)





other good.   The global demand for a particular product is given by aggregating (9) across all
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consumers in the global economy to obtain 
Maximizing (8) subject to the standard inter-temporal budget constraint and taking into account
(10) generates the standard differential equation that governs the evolution of per-capita consumption
expenditure
(11)
where   is the instantaneous market interest rate that prevails in country j at time t.  Equation (11)
implies that a constant per-capita consumption expenditure is optimal when the instantaneous interest
rate in each country equals the consumer’s subjective discount rate  .
2.4 Innovation Contests
At each instant in time, a typical industry is served by a quality leader, the only global producer of the
state-of-the-art quality product.  This producer is targeted by challengers from both countries who engage
in R&D to discover the next higher-quality product and replace the incumbent technology leader.  The
latter enjoys temporary global monopoly power and spends resources on rent protection activities (RPAs) 
in order to prolong its market position.  We assume that firms compete in prices in product markets, each
incumbent quality leader chooses the level of RPAs optimally to maximize expected discounted profits
and so does each challenger when choosing the level of R&D.  Challengers enter each innovation contest
until expected discounted profits associated with R&D are driven down to zero. 
 Since the arrival of innovations in each industry is governed by a Poisson process with intensity
, we can model the strategic interactions between a typical incumbent and its challengers as a
differential game for Poisson jump processes.  In Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2001) we formally solve
this game.  In this paper, we provide an informal and intuitive derivation of the equilibrium conditions￿j(t) ￿ M
k￿{h,f}














that closely follows the methodology employed by quality-ladders growth models. 
 At each instant in time, a global quality leader located in country j produces the state-of-the-art
quality product and earns a flow of profits
(12)
where the summation denotes the flow of monopoly profits in country k.  The last term in (12) captures
the cost of RPAs a quality leader incurs at time t.  Expression (12) assumes that both the manufacturing
of final goods and the production of RPAs is located  in country j.  Section 4 relaxes this assumption. 
The argument  , which indexes a particular industry, is omitted for notational simplicity because all
industries are structurally identical.  Following Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), we assume that all
firms in the world know how to produce products that are one or more steps below the highest-quality
available good in each industry’s quality ladder prevents the incumbent monopolist from engaging in
R&D to discover the next higher-quality product.  Therefore, as mentioned above, each incumbent
quality leader engages in RPAs, and each challenger invests in R&D.
There is a global stock market that supplies consumer savings to firms engaged in R&D.  Since
there is a continuum of structurally identical industries, each consumer can diversify completely the
industry-specific risk associated with the discovery of new products.  In addition, each investor can hold
a portfolio of foreign and domestic bonds.  This implies that the market interests rate,  , is the same in
both countries and is equal to the rate of return offered by a completely diversified portfolio.  At each
instant in time, each challenger issues securities promising to pay the flow of global monopoly profits
(divided by the number of shares) if the firm wins the innovation contest and zero otherwise.  The money
earned from the sale of these securities is equal to the wage bill of  workers engaged in R&D.  At each
instant in time, there are two types of securities in the stock market.  Those which issued by challengers
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Consider now the stock-market valuation of temporary monopoly profits.  Let   denote the
expected global discounted profits of a successful innovator located in country j, and let   be the
industry’s global rate of innovation, which equals the instantaneous probability of discovering a higher-
quality product.  Because   is the industry’s hazard rate, a shareholder faces a capital loss equal to
 if further innovation occurs.  This event occurs with instantaneous probability  .  In addition,
over a time interval dt, the shareholder receives a dividend   and the value of the quality leader’s
stock appreciates by   if the incumbent quality leader is not replaced.  The
survival probability is given by  .  The absence of profitable arbitrage opportunities means that
the expected rate of return on a stock issued by a successful innovator must equal to the market interest
rate; that is,
Taking limits as dt approaches zero and solving for   yields the following expression for the value of
innovation in a particular industry:
(13)
where the flow of economic profits   is defined by (12) and   is the hazard rate (i.e.,
the risk of default) associated with a typical industry whose production is located in country j. 
Let us consider now the economic problem of a typical challenger k located in country 



























where   is the instantaneous probability of discovering the next higher-quality
good,   is the reward to R&D, and the last term is the cost of R&D services over an infinitesimal
period of time.  Free entry into each R&D contest drives each challenger’s expected discounted profits
down to zero thereby resulting in the following zero-profit condition:
(14)
Equation (14) states that the price of innovation adjusted for the difficulty of conducting R&D, which is
proportional to the level of  rent-protection activities, equals the unit cost of conducting R&D.
We proceed with analyzing the maximization problem of a successful quality leader located in
country   and facing challengers from both countries.  This firm chooses the price of its product
and the level of RPAs to maximize its expected discounted profits in (13).  When maximizing (13) the
global quality leader behaves in a Nash fashion taking each challenger’s actions and the growth rate of
expected discounted profits as given.  The assumptions that goods within an industry are identical (when
adjusted for quality) and Bertrand price competition in product markets means that each quality leader
engages in limit pricing.  In addition, the absence of trade barriers and the assumption that the technology
of all products with lower quality than the state-of-the-art product in each industry is public knowledge
imply that the quality leader charges a single price, which is   times the lowest manufacturing cost
between the two countries (i.e., the lowest possible price of the product one step below in the quality
ladder); that is,
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15
(15)
Equation (15) relates the rate of innovation to the relative price of rent protection.  To see this
imagine that RPAs are produced under perfect competition so that their market price equals the unit cost
.  Then, the left-hand-side of (15) is proportional to the relative price of innovation, measured by the
expected discounted profits adjusted for the difficulty of R&D.  Equation (14) implies that the relative
price of  innovation equals the unit costs of R&D.  Consequently, combining these two profit-mazing
conditions and solving for the rate of innovation yields  .  This is simply the dual of (2) and
provides one of the main insights of the paper; that is, the rate of innovation is proportional to the relative
price of RPAs and depends on relative factor prices.  Thus, the removal of scale effects in this model sets
comparative-advantage considerations (captured by relative prices) at center stage of scale invariant
endogenous growth theory. 
2.5 Labor Markets
We assume that the market for each type of labor clears instantaneously.  In order to derive the full-
employment conditions for high- and low-skilled labor, we must calculate the steady-state distribution of
Home and Foreign quality leaders across the continuum of industries.  Denote with   the steady-state
fraction (measure) of industries with a Home quality leader and with   the fraction of
industries with a Foreign quality leader.  Since each industry is targeted by both Home and Foreign
challengers, with instantaneous probability   a Home challenger discovers a higher
quality product and an industry with a Foreign leader is transformed into an industry with a Home leader. 
Since there are   industries with Foreign quality leaders, the flow of industries that are transformed into
Home-quality-leader industries is equal to  .  This flow must be equal to the flow of
industries with Home quality leaders that are transformed into industries with Foreign quality leaders
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Using Shephard’s Lemma, we may let   denote the unit-labor requirement for
high-skilled labor employed in activity i = Z,X,Y.  Country j’s full-employment condition for high-skilled
labor is derived as follows.  The supply of high-skilled labor in country j equals  .  The demand
for high-skilled labor has three components.  First, there are   quality leaders in country j and each of
them supplies the global market with   units of final output.  Each unit of
output requires   units of high-skilled labor.  Therefore the demand for manufacturing labor in country
j is  .  Second, the demand for high-skilled labor in rent-protecting activities is  .  There
are   quality leaders located in country j, each of which produces   units of RPAs, and each unit of
which requires   amount of high-skilled labor.  Third, the demand for high-skilled labor in R&D in
each industry j is  .  All industries are targeted by challengers, each industry produces   units
of R&D services, and   is the amount of high-skilled labor required for the production of one unit of
R&D services.  Because each economy has a continuum of structurally identical industries of measure
one and all industries are targeted by challengers everywhere, it follows that  the demand for high-skilled
labor in each industry equals the economy-wide demand for R&D services in country j.  Consequently
the full-employment condition for high-skilled labor in country j (= h, f) is
(16)
Using Shephard’s Lemma again, denote with   the amount of low-skilled
labor required for the production of one unit of output in activity  .  Calculations similar to the
derivation of (16) generate the following full-employment condition for low-skilled  labor in country j:
(17)
The above four full-employment conditions hold at each instant in time under the assumption that there is
no multinational production and/or outsourcing of RPAs and R&D across the two countries.  We relaxw
j
H ￿ wH w
j
L￿ wL
￿ c j ￿ 0
r(t) ￿ ! x j ￿ X j/Nj(t)
￿ X
j(t)/X j(t) ￿ ￿ V
j(t)/V j(t) ￿ ￿ N
j(t)/N j(t) ￿ gN
p ￿ ￿.Z(wH,wL).
V h(t)/X h(t) ￿ V f(t)/X f(t)
￿(p,X,t) ￿ (￿￿ 1)
￿
[c hN h(t) ￿ c fN f(t)] ￿ .X(wH,wL)X(t) .
V(t) ￿ ￿(t)
! ￿ I ￿ gN
.
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this assumption later in Section 4.  Equations (16) and (17) complete the description of the model.
3. Steady-State Integrated-World Equilibrium
In this section we establish the existence of a unique steady-state equilibrium for the integrated-world
economy.  By an integrated-world-economy equilibrium we mean the resource allocation that would arise
when goods, services and factors of production are all perfectly mobile across activities and countries.  In
other words, we will treat the world as a closed economy.  In this equilibrium, factor prices are equalized
across the two countries and are constant over time, i.e.,   and   for j = h,f.  In addition,
all per-capita variables are constant over time as well.  For example,   and therefore (11) implies
; the per-capita level of RPAs,  , is also time invariant.  This property together with
(14) imply that the levels of RPAs and the reward to innovation grow at the constant rate of population
growth [i.e.,  ].  Factor-price equalization implies that the
equilibrium price of final consumption goods can be written as
(18)
Equation (14) implies that   which means that the level of RPAs does not
differ across industries.  Substituting (18) into (12) yields the following expression for the flow of
monopoly profits
(19)
Moreover, incorporating the above results into (13) leads to the standard expression for the expected
discounted profits in each industry
(20)log u(t)
z j ￿ c j/p
p
log u(t) ￿ log [c j/￿.Z] ￿ tIlog￿ .
u(t)
u(t)














In the spirit of other quality-ladders growth models, we can derive a deterministic expression for
the instantaneous per-capita utility  , which is the appropriate measure of real per-capita income in
the integrated equilibrium.  Substituting per-capita demand for final consumption goods  , where
 is given by (18), into (9) yields
13
(21)
 Subutility   captures the appropriate quality-weighted (real) consumption index in quality
ladder growth models.   The economy’s per-capita long-run growth can be defined as the growth rate of
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subutility   in (21).  Differentiating (21) with respect to time yields
(22)
Because the quality increment ￿ is a parameter capturing the size of innovations, long-run growth
can be affected only through changes in the rate of innovation  .  One can obtain a simple expression for
the latter by combining (14) and (16) and using the linear homogeneity of unit input requirements in
factor prices; that is, 
(23)
where   is the relative wage of high-skilled labor.
Equation (23), which holds both out and in the steady-state equilibrium, provides several insights
on the channels that affect long-run growth.  According to (23), the rate of innovation is proportional to
the ratio of two unit-cost functions  .  The numerator of this ratio is the unit-cost





















christen this ratio the economy’s “terms of growth” (TOG) because it can be interpreted as the “relative
price” of rent-protecting activities” expressed in units of R&D services, and it plays a role which is very
similar to the role of terms of trade in static models of international trade.  An economy with higher TOG
experiences faster long-run economic growth. 
 Parameter   can be interpreted as a measure of intellectual property protection because higher
values of this parameter imply that incumbents can limit more easily the flows of knowledge spillovers to
challengers.  For instance, stronger protection of intellectual property established by the TRIPs (Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement in the Uruguay Round, implies that patent infringement
litigation becomes more effective for any given level of RPAs.  What is the impact of stronger
intellectual rights protection on long-run growth?  It is obvious from (23) that, for any given value of the
relative wage  , an increase in the productivity of RPAs,  , causes the long-run growth to fall. 
Because we are interested in the effects of globalization on long-run growth, it is useful to establish
the precise mechanism by which a change in the relative wage of high-skilled labor affects the rate on
innovation and long-run growth.  Differentiating (23) with respect to   yields 
(24)
where   denotes the skill intensity (ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled labor) in activity i=X,Y,Z. 
The Appendix provides the detailed derivation of (24).  The following lemma summarizes the above
results:
Lemma 1:  (Long-Run Growth Channels)  An increase in intellectual property rights protection
captured by the effectiveness of rent-protecting activities, , reduces the rate of innovation,  , for
any given value of the relative wage  .  In the absence of factor intensity reversals, an





and the rate of innovation,  , if and only if the production of  rent-protecting activities uses  high-
skilled labor more intensively than the production of R&D services (i.e., iff   ).  
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Proof:  See (23) and (24).
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward.  An increase in the relative wage of high-skilled
labor raises the unit costs of both R&D and RPAs.  However, an increase in   causes the unit cost of the
activity that uses high-skilled labor intensively (i.e., has a higher share of unit costs associated with high-
skilled labor) to rise relatively more causing an increase in the TOG and the rate of innovation.
Lemma 1 has interesting implications for the empirics of long-run growth. For example, it provides
a possible explanation of why many variables have been correlated with long-run growth in cross-country
regressions [Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)].  According to Lemma 1, any variable that is correlated with
the relative wage,  , will also be correlated with the rates of innovation and long-run growth.  However,
if factor intensity reversals do not arise and the technology of RPAs differs across countries, then these
correlations will be weak.  Further, Lemma 1 introduces into the analysis the familiar Stolper-Samuelson
mechanism that links changes in relative wages to the rate of innovation (as opposed to Rybczynski type
of effects that relate changes in factor endowments with long-run growth, as emphasized in earlier
models of Schumpeterian growth.)
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Because the TOG depend on the relative wage of skilled labor, which is an endogenous variable
that is affected by virtually all parameters, we proceed to analyze the steady-state market equilibrium and
examine how relative factor abundance and country size affect the relative wage of high-skilled labor. 
Factor price equalization implies that the unit-labor requirements and units cost of production do not
differ across the two countries.  Therefore, we can aggregate the supply and demand for high-skilled and
low-skilled labor of the world economy, respectively, and derive two (as opposed to four) full-
employment conditions for the steady-state integrated-world equilibrium.H(t) ￿ s hN h(t) ￿ s fN f(t) L(t) ￿ (1￿s h)Nh(t) ￿ (1￿s f)N f(t)
gN
z ￿ Z(t)/N(t), x ￿ X(t)/N(t), y ￿ Y(t)/N(t)
H(t)
N(t)
￿ z3Z(wH,wL) ￿ x3X(wH,wL) ￿ y3Y(wH,wL).
L(t)
N(t)









2 ￿ (! ￿ gN)
/.Y(&)
.X(&)
1Z(&) ￿ 1X(&) ￿ 1Y(&)
1
￿￿ 1
2 ￿ (!￿ gN)
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Let   and   be the world endowments of
high-skilled labor low-skilled labor, respectively, which grow at the rate of population growth  .  Also,
let   be the per-capita world levels of final consumption good,
rent-protecting activities and R&D services, respectively.  Equation (16) help obtain the per-capita full
employment condition for high-skilled labor in the integrated-world equilibrium:
(25)
Similarly, (17) yields the per-capita full-employment condition for low-skilled labor:
(26)
The integrated-world equilibrium can be established by combining (25) and (26) and expressing
the per-capita levels z, x and y as functions of the relative wage of high-skilled labor.  Let
 be the share of high-skilled labor in the unit cost of activity i = Z, X, Y.  In the
Appendix we provide the algebraic details on the derivation of following equation that determines the
equilibrium relative wage of high-skilled labor   as a function of the model’s parameters:
(27)
 
The left-hand-side of (27) is the world economy’s relative supply of high-skilled labor (i.e., the
world’s skill abundance).  Because both H(t) and L(t) grow at the rate of population growth, the world
economy’s skill abundance remains constant over time.  The right-hand-side of (27) is the relative&
gU
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demand for high-skilled labor.  We will focus on the standard case in which the right-hand-side of (27) is
a decreasing function of the relative wage of high-skilled labor, which essentially requires the relative
demand for high-skilled labor to be downward-sloping.  It is easy to identify sufficient conditions that
ensure this.  For example, if RPAs are more intensive in high-skilled labor as compared to R&D, then it
is sufficient to assume that the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor in
production of each of the three activities is greater or equal to unity.  The latter assumption ensures that
each per-unit cost share of high-skilled labor is a  non-increasing function of the relative wage of high-
skilled labor.  If the skill intensity of RPAs is lower than that of R&D, then a sufficient condition for a
downward-sloping relative demand for high-skilled labor is that the elasticity of factor substitution in
manufacturing of final goods must be sufficiently greater than one and that the elasticities of factor
substitution in the other two activities must be equal or greater than unity.  From now on, we assume that
these conditions are satisfied.  These ideas can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1:  The integrated world economy has a unique steady-state equilibrium such that
a) the rate of innovation, I, per capita consumption expenditure, c, the relative wage of high-
skilled labor,  , per-capita RPAs, x, and per-capita R&D investment, y, are all constant
over time and bounded;
b) long-run Schumpeterian growth,  , is endogenous and does not exhibit scale effects.
The endogeneity of long-run growth has been established by Lemma 1, since any policy change
that affects the relative wage of high-skilled labor (i.e., an R&D subsidy, a relative wage subsidy, a tariff)
has a permanent impact on the TOG, the rate of innovation and long-run growth.  Fig. 1 illustrates the
steady-state integrated world equilibrium by plotting the relative supply and relative demand curves for
high-skilled labor.  The relative supply curve, RS, corresponds to the left-hand-side of (27) and is the
vertical line in the figure.  The relative demand for high-skilled labor RD corresponds to the right-hand-&￿
gN ￿ 0




(1X ￿ 1Z) ￿ (1Y ￿ 1Z)>0
hX >h Y >h Z
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side of (27) and is the negatively-sloped curve.  The unique intersection between the two curves at point
E determines the steady-state value of the relative wage  .  Once the equilibrium relative wage is
determined, the rest of the endogenous variables are determined as well.
Also notice that, in the absence of population growth (i.e.,  ), the integrated-world economy
experiences positive and endogenous long-run growth.  In contrast, a class of Schumpeterian growth
models [e.g., Jones (1995b) and Segerstrom (1998), among others] yield zero long-run growth if the
economy’s population is not growing.  Consequently, the present model represents a novel generalization
of earlier endogenous-growth models.
We proceed with analyzing the effect of various parameter changes on the rate of innovation, long-
run growth and wages.  In order to structure the discussion and exposition, for the remaining analysis we 
will assume a particular ranking of skill intensity across all three activities: rent protection activities is
the activity with the highest skill intensity followed by R&D, which in turn exceeds the skill intensity of
manufacturing.  In other words, without loss of generality, we will assume that  .  The
reader can easily modify the results of the analysis to alternative assumptions regarding the intensity
ranking across activities.  We will also assume that there are no factor-intensity reversals, namely that the
above skill intensity ranking holds for all values of admissible factor prices (i.e., for all values of  ). 
Equation (23) and Fig. 1 can be used to perform standard comparative statics exercises.  For
example, an increase in the growth rate of population,  , or a decline in the subjective discount rate,  , 
raises the demand of high-skilled labor, for any given value of the relative wage,  , if and only if 
manufacturing is the least high-skilled labor intensive activity [i.e., iff   which
follows from the assumption  ].  In this case, an economy with faster population growth, or
lower interest rates, enjoys a higher wage of high-skilled labor and a higher rate of long- run growth if
and only if rent-protecting activities use high-skilled labor more intensively than R&D services (see
Lemma 1).  In other words, the growth effect of a change in the rate of population growth is governed by




an ambiguous effect on long-run growth.  This prediction is consistent with cross-country growth
regressions reported in Dinopoulos and Thompson (2000), where the correlation between per-capita
long-run growth and population growth is not statistically significant. 
What are the general-equilibrium steady-state effects of stronger intellectual property protection,
captured by an increase in  , on long-run growth and income distribution?  An increase in   reduces the
relative demand for high-skilled labor in Fig. 1 if manufacturing is the least high-skilled labor intensive
activity and lowers the relative wage of high-skilled labor.  The Appendix of the paper establishes that, as
long as the relative demand of skilled labor is sufficiently steep, or if rent-protection activities are more
skilled -labor intensive than R&D, an increase in intellectual property protection reduces the rate of
innovation and long-run growth.  This result is consistent with similar theoretical findings in dynamic
North-South models developed by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2004) and Sener (2003).  In these
models, Northern products are copied endogenously by Southern firms, and stronger intellectual property
is modeled as an increase in the difficulty of imitation.  Both of these studies find that stronger
intellectual property protection reduces temporary or permanently the rate of economic growth and
widens the North-South wage gap.  Consequently, this model suggests that agreements like TRIPs will be
supported by owners of factors that are used intensively in manufacturing and opposed by owners of
factors used intensively in investment activities.  In addition, unlike the popular perception, the TRIPs
agreement might not necessarily promote long-run growth and innovation. 
The following proposition describes the effects of stronger intellectual property protection:
Proposition 2:  Stronger intellectual property protection, captured by parameter,  , benefits the factor
of production used more intensively in manufacturing of final consumption goods (i.e., lower-
skilled labor).  A global economy with stronger-intellectual property protection experiences slower
long-run growth and innovation if rent-protection activities are sufficiently more skilled-labor






unity, or if the economy’s skill abundance ( ) is sufficiently high.
Proof: See the Appendix.
It is also straight forward to analyze the effects of an increase in factor abundance   on long-run
growth and wages with the help of Fig. 1.  An economy with higher skill abundance is characterized by
lower relative wage of skilled-labor (this is a purely supply effect), but the effects of a higher relative
wage of skilled labor on growth are ambiguous and depend on the skill intensity ranking between RPAs
and R&D.  The following proposition summarizes the effects of higher factor abundance:
Proposition 3:  An economy with higher skilled-labor abundance,  , has a lower relative wage
of high-skilled labor,  , and experiences lower long-run growth if and only if the skill intensity of
rent-protecting activities  exceeds the skill intensity of R&D (i.e., iff   ).
Proof: It follows from Fig. 1 and Lemma 1.
Proposition 3 states that an economy experiences faster long-run growth, if R&D uses its abundant
factor more intensively than RPAs.  This is so because the opportunity cost of R&D services is “cheaper”
than that of RPAs in economies with higher relative skill abundance. 
4.  Globalization, Comparative Advantage and Long-Run Growth
This section analyzes the effects of a move from autarky (closed economy) to the steady-state integrated
world equilibrium by considering two distinct cases.  First, we consider the case of two countries that are
identical in all respects except the sizes of their population.  Second, we examine the growth and income
distribution effects of globalization in the more general case where Home and Foreign have different
proportions of high-skilled workers.  For specificity (but no loss of generality) we assume that Home iss h ￿ s f ￿ sN h g N f
H(t)/L(t) ￿ H j(t)/L j(t) ￿ s/(1￿ s)
&￿
￿j ￿ N j(t)/N(t)
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high-skilled labor abundant.  We also assume that the per-capita distribution of world factor endowments
across the two countries lies within the “factor-price-equalization set” (to be defined below).  This
assumption simply means that trade will bring about (productivity-adjusted) factor price equalization . 
This case allows us to highlight the interaction between differences in activity-specific skill intensities
and differences in factor proportions across the two countries.  The phrase “a move from autarky to the
integrated-world equilibrium” is used loosely to imply a comparison between two structurally identical
economies with one economy in autarkic steady-state and the other in the integrated-world steady-stage
equilibrium.  In other words, we abstract from analyzing the transitional dynamics from autarky to free
trade.  Finally, it should be noted that when countries differ in factor abundance, trade in consumption
goods is not sufficient to equalize the relative wage of skilled labor between the two counties.  In
addition to intra-sectoral trade, the model generates multinationals and outsourcing of manufacturing
and/or services.
The first case can be illustrated with the help of Fig. 1.  By assumption,   but  ,
therefore, the relative supply of high-skilled labor in each country coincides with that of the integrated
world economy; that is,  .  Since (27) describes both the autarky and
integrated-world equilibria, each country’s relative supply curve will coincide with RS in Fig. 1.  Further,
as can be seen in (27), both countries grow at the same rate and have the same autarkic relative wage,
, regardless of their exact differences in population-size.  A move from autarky to the integrated world
equilibrium does not affect the rate of innovation and long-run growth in either of the two countries. 
Nonetheless, globalization generates intra-sectoral trade between the two countries even if it does
not change their growth rates.  This is so because a fraction   of industries are populated by
country j’s quality leaders enjoying temporary global monopoly power and serving consumers in both
Home and Foreign.  In the absence of multinational enterprises, each industry experiences random shifts
in the location of production, and resources devoted to exports and imports in each country grow at the
rate of population growth. & gU
N h(t) ￿ N f(t) s h￿ s f
&
gU
H h(t)/L h(t) > H(t)/L(t) > H f(t)/L f(t)
s h >sf
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Proposition 4:  Assume that Home and Foreign differ only in size measured by the level of population. 
A move from autarky to trade generates intra-sectoral trade, but does not have any effects on the
relative wage of high-skilled labor,  , or long-run growth,   .
Proof:  It follows from Fig. 1 and Lemma 1.
Proposition 4 highlights the difference between this model and earlier models of endogenous
growth with scale effects that have analyzed the impact of globalization in the context of two structurally
identical economies [e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a)].  The older models generate a positive effect
of trade on long-run  growth which is based on the existence of scale effects.  Here the growth scale
effects are removed by introducing rent-protecting activities and the introduction of trade does not affect
factor prices and endogenous long-run growth.
To see the intuition for this result more clearly consider the case of two structurally identical
economies, as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a), or as in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999b) where
 and  .  In this case, a move from autarky to free trade results in each country having
quality leaders in fifty percent of all industries.  There is a resource reallocation from import competing
to exporting industries in each country, but since in the integrated equilibrium the number of consumers
served by each quality leader is twice as large as the number of consumers served in autarky, the
introduction of trade does not change per-capita resources devoted to R&D and RPAs.  Thus, the removal
of scale effects removes the market-size impact of international trade that was discovered and discussed
extensively in earlier endogenous growth models [e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapter 5)].
The second case focuses on the effects of globalization on the relative wage,  , and on long-run
growth,  , when countries differ in skill abundance.  Fig. 2 illustrates this case, under our assumption
that Home is skill-abundant [i.e.,  ].  This case arises if a higher
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relative supply of high-skilled labor, RS  , is located to the right of  Foreign’s relative supply, RS  , and 
h f
both countries face the same downward-sloping relative demand curve RD, Home’s relative wage of
high-skilled labor is lower than Foreign’s (i.e.,  ).  Thus, a move from autarky to the integrated-
world equilibrium causes Home’s relative wage to rise   to   and Foreign’s relative wage to fall from
 to  .  At the integrated-world equilibrium, both countries enjoy the same rate of long-run growth. 
Therefore, as in the traditional static Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, globalization brings equalization in
factor prices and benefits the abundant factor of production. 
Given our assumptions on no factor intensity reversals (i.e., the ranking of skill intensities across
the three activities remains unchanged for all values of  ) and the skill intensity of RPAs exceeds the
skill intensity of R&D (i.e.,   ), Home’s long-run growth is lower than Foreign’s at the initial
equilibrium.  In this case globalization raises Home’s long-run growth but reduces Foreign’s growth.
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 Finally, notice that the relative supply of world high-skilled labor can be expressed as
(28)
Because  , the world’s relative supply of high-skilled labor is a weighted sum of the
national relative factor endowments of high-skilled labor with the weights being equal to the share of
low-skilled labor that is associated with each of the two countries.  In other words, curve RS in Fig. 2 is 
closer to curve RS  the higher is the fraction of world’s low-skilled workers living in the Home country. 
h
It is obvious from Fig. 2 that the relative wage and growth effects of globalization are larger for the
country with a smaller fraction of world’s endowment of low-skilled labor.  Thus, we have
 Proposition  5:   Assume that the two countries differ in skill abundance and that there are no factor
intensity reversals.  Then a move from autarky to the integrated-world equilibrium results in:







, between the two countries;
b) a rise (fall) in the relative wage,  , of the high-skill (low-skill) abundant country;
c) a rise in the long-run growth rate,  , of the high-skilled abundant country, and a fall in  
 for the low-skilled abundant country if and only if the skill intensity of rent-protecting
activities is higher than the skill intensity of R&D,   .
d) the magnitude of the above-mentioned effects is inversely related to the relative size of each
country (measured by the fraction of its low-skilled labor in world population),  .
  The prediction of factor price equalization, despite apparent total factor productivity differences
(captured here by aggregate quality differentials) across the two countries, is consistent with empirical
studies following Trefler’s (1993, 1995) seminal work.  These studies have found that factor price
equalization across countries holds when production factors are adjusted for uniform productivity
differences.   In addition, Lemma 1 offers a novel link between relative wages and total factor
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productivity growth!  The main result of proposition 5 complements and clarifies the finding of
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999b) where trade liberalization in the form of reciprocal tariff reductions
between two countries with identical endowments and sizes generates growth effects.  In both cases,
scale invariant growth is affected by policies that change the relative price of innovation and/or relative
factor prices.  Of course, in the present model countries differ in factor endowments and therefore long-
run the TOG move in opposite directions, whereas in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999b) the two
countries are structurally identical and, as a result, each country’s TOG move in the same direction. 
We conclude this section by describing the rich production patterns that emerge in the steady-state
integrated-world equilibrium.  These patterns are consistent with various facets of globalization, such as,
for example, the formation of multinationals and outsourcing, which play a prominent role in the ongoing
academic and policy debate on the pros and cons of globalization (Bhagwati, 2004).  Fig. 3 illustrates the
per-capita factor price equalization set of the integrated-world economy.  The diagonal of the boxhX >h Y >h Z
H h(t)/L h(t) ￿
H(t)/L(t) ￿ H f(t)/L f(t)
￿h ￿ N h(t)/N(t) ￿ OE0/OO￿
￿h ￿ I h/I ￿ N h(t)/N(t)
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diagram corresponds to the per-capita vector of high-skilled and low-skilled labor H(t)/N(t), L(t)/N(t),
respectively.  The vectors OA = O*A’, AB = A’B’, and BO* = B’O represent the per-capita amounts of
high-skilled and low-skilled labor employed in the production of rent protecting services, R&D services,
and manufacturing of final goods.  The slopes of these vectors reflect the assumption that the skill
intensity of RPAs is the highest, followed by the skill intensity of R&D services, which in turn is higher
than that of manufacturing (i.e.,  ). 
The factor price equalization set (FPE) is defined as the set of all per-capita factor endowment
allocations between the two countries such that each country can fully employ its resources using the
integrated-world equilibrium skill intensities of each activity.  The FPE set is represented by the area
inside the hexagon OABO*A’B’.  Points O and O* respectively represent the origins of Home and
Foreign.
Suppose that the per-capita distribution of the two factor endowments across the two countries is
given by point E  which lies on the diagonal OO* of the box diagram.  In this case, the two countries 0
have identical skill abundance ratios which equal to the slope of the box’s diagonal [i.e., 
.  The fraction of industries that contain Home quality leaders is given by
.  By drawing vectors CD, DF, and FG that are parallel to vectors AB, BO*
and B’A’, respectively, one could illustrate the per-capita quantity of resources devoted to each of the
three activities by each country.  For example, the Home country’s per-capita endowment vector is OE  = 0
OC + CD + DE , where OC, CD and DE  are the vectors that correspond to the amount of Home country 0 0
resources devoted to the production of rent protection, R&D services, and manufacturing of final goods. 
This allocation of resources is consistent with its two per-capita full employment conditions [see (16) and
(17)] and the activity-specific production techniques of the integrated equilibrium.  To see this observe
that triangle OAB is similar to triangle OCD, and triangle OBO* is similar to ODE  .  This means that the 0
ratios OC/OA = CD/AB = DE /BO* = OE /OO* are equal to  .  In other words, 00





investment in each industry.  Similar considerations apply to Foreign, whose per-capita factor
endowment vector is given by O*E  = O*G + GF + FE  .  Foreign’s per-capita resources account for a 00
fraction   of each activity which equals its share of world R&D in each industry.
 For any distribution of factor endowments on the diagonal OO* determined by a point such as E , 0
international trade in final consumption goods suffices to equalize factor prices and long-run growth rates
between the two countries.  However, if the two countries differ in factor abundance, then factor price
equalization can be achieved through multinational-firm formation or outsourcing, in addition to trade in
final consumption goods.  The reasons for this property can be traced to the assumption that all industries
are symmetric, and that the different activities in each industry have to be specifically tied to each other
through dynamic linkages.  One could add another degree of freedom by assuming the existence of an
outside-good sector produced under perfect competition, as in Dinopoulos et al. (1993) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991), or by introducing differences in skill intensities in the production of final goods. 
This extension of the model is straightforward. 
In the model, if the point that determines the distribution of per-capita factor endowments lies
inside triangle OBO*, say point E  in Fig. 3, the integrated world equilibrium can be obtained with the 1
formation Home-based multinational companies.  In this case, Home would devote OC resources to
RPAs, CD resources to R&D services, and would have quality leaders in   industries, as before. 
However, it can devote only DE  resources to the production of final consumption goods.  The 1
integrated-world equilibrium can be replicated if Home quality leaders devote DE  resources in the 0
production of final consumption goods by hiring DE  resources at Home and E E  resources at Foreign.  11 0
One possible pattern of multinational production that is consistent with this equilibrium is for each Home
quality leader to produce a fraction equal   at Foreign.  This is the case of the formation of
horizontal multinationals (these firms produce the same product at Home and Foreign to serve the
domestic market).  Another symmetric pattern of multinational production is that a fraction   of
Home quality leaders transfers all their production of final output to the Foreign country.  This is the case32
of vertical Home multinationals that engage in RPAs at Home, manufacture all output in Foreign and
export from Foreign to Home.  Of course, since there is a continuum of industries, both patterns of
multinational production can coexist.  In addition, the above patterns are consistent also with outsourcing
of manufacturing from Home to Foreign.  These patterns of multinational production and manufacturing
outsourcing are consistent with constant returns to scale technology in production, although the latter is
associated with a higher volume of intra sectoral trade.  The production pattern of Foreign quality leaders
remains the same as the one analyzed in the previous case.
If the point that determines the distribution of per-capita factor endowments between the two
countries lies inside triangle OAB, such as point E  in Fig. 3, then all final-goods production takes place 2
in the Foreign country, and the Home country transfers a fraction of R&D activities to the Foreign
country as well.  In other words, the model generates outsourcing of R&D services (i.e., the
establishment of Home-owned R&D labs at Foreign), multinational production, and trade in final
consumption goods.  Finally, if the skill intensity of R&D is higher than that of RPAs, then for
endowment-distribution points located in the interior of triangle OAB, the model generates outsourcing
of RPAs (as opposed to R&D services).  Therefore, the integrated world equilibrium is consistent with a
rich pattern of production and globalization which depends on the magnitude of skill-abundance
differences between the two countries. 
In other words, as the difference in skilled abundance between the two countries increases, the skill
abundant country transfers the production of skill-intensive activities to the less skill-abundant country
through outsourcing or the formation of multinationals.  As in the traditional Heckhscher-Ohlin, the
driving force that generates these patterns is differences in the relative wage of skilled workers.  This
prediction sheds light to the ongoing outsourcing of high-tech services from the US to countries like
China and India.   33
5. Concluding  Remarks
The present paper developed a two-country scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model to address the
effects of globalization on long-run growth and wages.  The introduction of rent-protecting activities 6
that prolong  the expected duration of monopoly power for incumbents by reducing the expected
innovation payoffs for challengers 6 removes the scale effects property, however, without foregoing  the
(policy) endogeneity of long-run growth.  Interestingly, growth is proportional to the opportunity cost of
RPAs measured in units of R&D services, which depend only on factor prices under constant returns to
scale.  The absence of scale effects make steady-state predictions of the analysis consistent with post-war
time-series evidence presented by Jones (1995a), and generates long-run growth that is bounded and
constant over time, even in the presence of positive population growth. 
The removal of scale effects has profound implications for the literature concerned with the effects
of trade on long-run growth.  Unlike earlier models of endogenous growth which have emphasized the
positive impact of market-size expansion on long-run growth, the absence of scale effects neutralizes the
market-size trade-related effect on long-run growth.  In the present model, a move from autarky to free
trade between two growing economies that differ only in population size does not effect long-run growth. 
In this case, there is reallocation of per-capita resources in manufacturing of final goods within each
country and globalization generates intra-sectoral trade as some domestic quality leaders become global
quality leaders while others are replaced by Foreign quality leaders producing superior quality products. 
However, under constant returns of scale in production, this type of resource reallocation does not affect
factor prices and the per-capita allocation of resources between RPAs and R&D.  Consequently, long-run
growth under trade and autarky for each country do not differ.
The model also allows us to analyze how cross-country differences in factor abundance condition 
the effects of globalization on long-run growth.  A move from autarky to the integrated world equilibrium
generates convergence in long-run growth rates that follows from factor price equalization across the two
countries.  The direction of change in each country’s growth rate depends on the rankings of factor34
abundance across countries and factor intensities across activities.  For example, if Home is skilled-
abundant and production of R&D services is the most skill intensive activity, Home has a lower relative
wage and grows faster than Foreign under autarky.  Globalization, captured by a move from autarky to
the integrated world equilibrium, equalizes the growth rates in both countries by causing Home’s growth
rate to fall and Foreign’s to rise. The integrated equilibrium is consistent with a rich pattern of production
including intra-sectoral trade, the formation of multinationals and outsourcing of R&D and RPAs.  This
pattern of production is analogous to the one analyzed in earlier models of Schumpeterian growth but, of
course, these models exhibit scale effects.
The analysis and insights of this paper have several interesting implications for the empirics of
R&D-based growth in open economies.  The model provides a novel explanation for the absence of a
strong correlation between measures of trade openness and growth in cross-country regressions [see, for
example, Dinopoulos and Thompson (2000)].  In a global economy experiencing scale-invariant
Schumpeterian growth, trade in high-tech industries among countries with similar factor endowments has
minimal (if any) effect on long-run growth.  In addition, higher levels of globalization among countries
with different factor proportion is associated with slower or faster long-run growth depending on whether
or not a country is high-skilled or low-skilled labor abundant relative to the skill abundance of the global
economy and on the skill intensity ranking across various production activities.  In other words, the
model predicts that the effects of globalization on growth are conditional on the same mechanisms that
capture the forces of comparative advantage in the traditional static Heckscher-Ohlin trade model.
The analysis opens several new avenues for research.  A variety of trade policy instruments (e.g.,
tariffs, export taxes and subsidies) could be introduced in the model to analyze their growth effects when
countries differ in size or factor endowments.  This generalization would complement a recent strand in
the literature that analyzes the effects of tariffs on growth without scale effects, based on the restrictive
assumption that all countries are structurally identical without any differences in factor abundance and/or
population size [e.g., Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999a, 1999b)].R - 1
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1. Derivation of Equation (24)
Differentiating (23) with respect to the relative wage   yields 
(A1)
The linear homogeneity of unit-cost functions implies   for i=X,Y,Z.
Substituting this expression in (A1) together with some algebraic manipulation yield (24). 
2. Derivation of Equation (27)
Let   be the per-capita world consumption expenditure. Equation (10) and
the limit pricing condition   imply that the per-capita level of final output in the integrated
world equilibrium is given by 
(A2)
Equations (2) and (3) imply that  .  Combining this expression with (23) yields 
(A3)
Structural symmetry of the model across industries means that the each quality leader devotes the same
amount of per-capita rent-protecting activities x in the integrated-world equilibrium.  Substituting (3) and
(13) into the zero-profit condition (14) and evaluating the relevant variables in the integrated-world
equilibrium yields the following per-capita zero profit condition:(￿￿ 1)c
￿


























Substituting   in (A4) [see (23)] and combining the resulting expression with (A2)
yields the following expression for z:
(A5)
where (23) has been used to express the rate of innovation as a function of the relative wage of high-
skilled labor. 
Equations (A3) and (A5) provide expressions for the levels of per-capita R&D and final output as
functions of the relative wage of high-skilled labor  .  Substituting these expressions into the two per-
capita full employment conditions (25) and (26), using the definition of the share of high-skilled labor in
the unit cost of each activity   (for i=Z,X,Y), and dividing the resulting equations yields
(27).
4. Effects of Stronger Protection Intellectual Property




Equations (A6) and (A7) are the same as equations (23) and (27) respectively, where   is
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(A8)
Lemma 1 implies that the sign of  is indeterminate, whereas  .  In addition,
differentiating (A8) yields   -as long as the factor elasticity of substitution is not less than
unity- and   given our assumption on skill-intensity
ranking across activities (i.e., manufacturing is the least skilled-labor intensive activity).  This condition,
implies that an increase in parameter / reduces the steady-state relative wage of skilled-labor.
Totally differentiating (A6) and (A7) and solving for   yields the following expression
(A9)
Equation (A9) reveals the direct and indirect effects of stronger intellectual property rights on the rate of
innovation and long-run growth.  The former effect is captured by    and slows the long-run
rate of innovation and growth for any given relative wage.  The second term in the bracketed expression
captures the indirect effect of stronger intellectual rights protection.  In general, the sign of the indirect
effect is indeterminate, but one could easily impose sufficient conditions to ensure that the sign of (A9) is
negative.  Notice that as long as the absolute value of second term in square brackets is less than unity,
the direct effect dominates.  For example, our assumption on intensity rankings    implies
that   and that  , and therefore for a sufficiently large difference in   (see
equation (24) the denominator of the second term in square brackets becomes negative.  In this case, the
sign of (A9) is negative, and  stronger intellectual rights protection decreases the relative wage of skilled
workers and long-run growth. 
If the elasticity of factor substitution across activities is unity, then the right hand side of (A8) does0f/0& ￿ 0
hY >h X >h Z
h
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not depend on the relative wage (i.e.,  ) and the indirect effect vanishes.  Again, the sign of
(A9) is negative in this case.  Finally, even in the case where R&D is the most skilled-labor intensive
activity ( ) and the denominator of the second term in square brackets becomes positive
giving rise to a possible sign ambiguity, for a sufficiently high value of skilled-labor abundance  , the
absolute value of the denominator of this term exceeds that of the numerator, and again the sign of (A9)
remains negative.  These reasonable sufficient conditions strongly suggest that an increase in intellectual
property rights protection is very likely to reduce the long-run rate of innovation and growth by making
the R&D effort of challengers more difficult.E-1
1.  See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Chapter 12), and Dinopoulos and Thompson (2000)
among many others.
2.  Earlier closed-economy endogenous growth models include the ones developed by Aghion and Howitt
(1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapter 4), Romer (1990) and Segerstrom at al. (1990).
3.  Jones (1999), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1999), and Dinopoulos and Sener (2003) provide more
details on this issue.
4.  See Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999a,b) and Sener (2001) for an analysis of the effects of
symmetric tariff reductions in the context of two structurally identical countries. Krugman (1979), Sener
(2003), and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2004) have developed North-South models with one factor of
production, technology transfer and scale-invariant growth to study the effects of globalization on the
North-South wage gap.
5.  The term Schumpeterian growth refers to a particular type of R&D-based (endogenous or exogenous)
long-run growth generated through the introduction of new products and processes according to
Schumpeter’s (1934) description of the process of creative destruction.
6.  Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2001) provide more examples of these activities, and Cohen et al. (2000)
supply survey based data on the extent of these activities.
7.  In contrast, in Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2001) we assume that the production of RPAs uses only
high-skilled labor, whereas the production of R&D services and manufacturing of final products uses
only low-skilled labor.
8.  Arrow (1962) was the first to establish that as long as an incumbent monopolist faces the same
probability as a challenger of discovering a new process or product innovation, the former’s reward to
engaging in R&D investment is lower than the latter’s due to the replacement effect.  The presence of the
replacement effect prevents the incumbent from engaging in further R&D especially if there is free entry
in each R&D race.  If the incumbent faces a higher probability than each challenger to discover the next
process or product innovation, then the incumbency-inertia property does not hold. In the present model,
each incumbent engages in RPAs which reduce endogenously the R&D effectiveness of challengers, but
these activities do not create an R&D advantage for a typical incumbent at the (symmetric) equilibrium.
The assumption that every firm in the word knows how to produce the product which is one step
below the state-of-the-art quality product is sufficient to exclude any R&D effort by an  incumbent firm.
If an incumbent firm discovers the next higher-quality product, say product k+1, the technology of
product k becomes common knowledge and therefore the monopolist continues to earn the same flow of
profits as before.  Thus the return to incumbent’s R&D investment is zero and there is no incentive for
the monopolist to engage in innovative R&D.  Thus, the Arrow effect is still present and prevents
incumbents from engaging in further R&D.  However, the incumbent has an incentive to delay the
discovery of product k+1 by engaging in RPAs and by making the R&D effort of challengers more
difficult.
9.  Eaton and Kortum (1996, 1997, 1999) have developed dynamic general equilibrium models of
international technology diffusion and growth.  Keller (2004) offers an excellent survey of the
voluminous literature on this important topic which lies beyond the limited scope of the present paper.
Endnotesu(t)
E-2
10.  See Varian (1992) for more details on the properties of unit-cost functions.
11.  A proper modeling of skill formation requires an endogenous division of population between high-
skilled and low-skilled labor that results in higher wage for high-skilled workers compared to that of low-
skilled ones [see Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) for a model of Schumpeterian growth with
endogenous skill formation that has theses features]. In the present paper we abstract from issues
associated with endogenous skill formation in order to focus on the interaction between factor abundance
and factor intensities which are the basic ingredients of comparative advantage. 
12.  We also assume that if two products command the same quality-adjusted price, consumers buy the
higher quality product although they are formally indifferent between the two products.
13.  See Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chapter 4) for further details.
14.  For instance, in quality-ladders growth models where  innovation improves the quality of
intermediate inputs or results in process improvements,  captures the level of final output. See
Grossman and Helpman (1991) for further details on this point.
15.  The assumption of no-factor intensity reversals implies that the ranking of the two ratios evaluated at
the same relative wage is not reversed for all possible values of the relative wage of high-skilled labor.
16.  See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
17.  However, if the skill intensity of R&D exceeds the skill intensity of PRAs, then globalization causes
Home’s long-run growth to fall and Foreign’s long-run growth to rise.  Of course, one could readily
introduce factor intensity reversals and obtain the same changes in the growth rate of both countries as
they move from autarky to the integrated world equilibrium. 
18.  Feenstra (2004, Chapter 2) offers an excellent critical overview of various empirical tests for the
standard static Heckscher-Ohlin model.